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Miscellaneous

1992

Exxon proposal: Resolution & Letter to Shareholders
In 1992, Robert Monks sent a letter to Exxon shareholders about his shareholder resolution to establish a 3-person panel of shareholder representatives to the board. These representatives would be selected by shareholders, and the cost would be borne by the company -- hence proportionately by all shareholders. 1992 Letter to Exxon Shareholders (pdf) 1992 Shareholder Resolution to Exxon (pdf)

1992 Exxon Shareholder Resolution
In 1992, Bob Monks submitted a shareholder resolution for the Exxon annual meeting to establish a shareholder committee to give owners more say and control in decision-making at the company. 1992 Shareholder Resolution to Exxon (pdf)

Monks Letter to Exxon Shareholders
In 1992, Bob Monks wrote to his fellow Exxon shareholders about his resoultion to form a committee of shareholders that would contribute to management and board oversight at the company. Read the 1992 Letter to Exxon Shareholders (pdf)

1989

U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
For many years, the U.S. corporate system has been one in which ownership of corporations -- by public shareholders -- has been separated from control of those corporations -- by professional managers. The key question of corporate governance has been, "Just how do you align the interests of managers with the public shareholders?" It has been argued that takeovers serve that purpose, by weeding out managers who have not kept stock prices high for their public shareholders. However, some takeovers result in tremendous costs to employees, as well as to local economies. This leads to two questions. Does the fact that we have so many takeovers mean our other structures for accountability -- for example, use of the proxy process -- have failed? Is there a better way to structure our system so that the displacements that come from takeovers and forced restructurings are not necessary?

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Copyright 2019 by Robert A. G. Monks