Do Today's Powerful Institutional Investors Belong in the Board Room? [PDF]
Bob Monks discusses the role of managment and shareholders in corporations:   "Why can't U.S. corporate managment do the job alone? Because American chief cxecutives are increasingly accountable only to themselves. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that shareholders have ultimate authority, CEOs frequently get involved in choosing (or approving the selection of) hoard memhers, who then control the proxy process and involvement hy owners.  In the end, there is no effective accountability to anyone -- a status to be envied by sovereigns."  1990


Fiduciary Language [PDF]
An essay debating self-regulation of the institutional fund industry.  "Control over the private sector of the economy simply is too important to be delegated to institutional trustees as part of their commercial responsibility."


Letter to William Greider regarding the Federal Reserve [PDF]
Bob Monks letter to William Greider following regarding an article about the Federal Reserve in the New Yorker in 1987.  About this letter, Bob says, "This was the beginning of a fine relationship with Bill Grieder who continues to write trenchantly on these issues.  It is interesting that I anticipated some of the problems that banking regulators encountered twenty years after this letter."

The Emerging Federal Law of Ownership [PDF]
The system of corporation law has developed in order to provide an optimal interrelationship between money, management and the interests of society. Those who put their money at risk, the owners, were able to limit liability to the amount of their investments.  Written as an internal memo for ISS.


Letter to the Editor, Newsweek [PDF]
Letter to the editor of Newsweek in December 8, 1986 clarifying the way the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) operated.  Bob managed Department of Labor's pension plan under President Reagan in 1984.  For a brief history of FERSA, ERISA and public pension plans see chapter 2 of Corporate Governance by Robert AG Monks & Nell Minow.


A New Fiduciary Dilemma For Managers [PDF]
Bob Monks describes ERISA rules and the history of pension plans in a special section of Barrons, 1985.

The Year of the Owners [PDF]
Bob Monks, addresses ownership and owner's ability to resist takeovers in this internal resource memo to ISS employees.  1985.


Lack Of Unity In Congress And Business Creates Crisis-To-Crisis Response To Employee Benefits [PDF]
Interview with Department of Labor's Robert Monks discussing employee benefit plans.  1984.

Interview With Pension Administrator Robert Monks [PDF]
Appointed by President Reagan as Pension Administrator in the Department of Labor, Bob Monks discusses ownership and control of pension assets.  June 1984. 

Interview With Pension Administrator Robert Monks [PDF]
Appointed at Pension Administrator in the U.S. Department of Labor by President Reagan in 1984, Bob Monks talks about his job as trustee of public employee benefits.  "You cannot ignore the sheer volumes accounted for by pension funds. They represent something like one quarter of aU the stock in the markets, and they account for a little higher proportion than that in new issues. Sometime before the end of this century, pension funds will pass 50 percent ownership of publicly traded American corporations.  That raises a number of interesting questions. For instance, how will pension funds exercise the authority of ownership?"

How Bob Monks Plans to Shake Up Pensionland [PDF]
More than any of his predecessors, Robert Monks the new ERISA administrator, has the political power and connections to get things done. Here's a look at how he intends to use them.  1984

The Invisible Hand: Remarks by Pensions Administrator Robert Monks [PDF]
Remarks by Pensions & Benefits Welfare Program Administrator Robert A.G. Monks on "Unshackling the Invisible Hand: The Liberation of ERISA Trustees" to the Buruea of National Affairs Converence on The basics of employee benefits.  February 1984.

Copyright 2021 by Robert A. G. Monks